tha t effort and personal productivity have won them, instead of leaving these rewards to the mercy of illness and injury, which are so often a matter of chance. Heal th disasters can reduce to penury persons who have been hard-working and productive all their lives. This makes a mockery of reward for production and for effort.
The considerations just outlined-(l) providing a decent minimum, (2) establishing equal ity of opportunity, and (3) protecting rewards earned through effort and production from the ravages of chance misfortunes-can be grouped under the label of fairness. (1) and (2) have probably underlain what our society has done for some of the poor through Medicaid and for all of the elderly th rough Medicare. But (3) seems to argue for taking health care ou t of the private reward system altogether. Since chance plays such an important role in illness and injury, does not fairness to individuals require making sure that their financial status is not substantially altered through the cost of hea lth care? In other words, does not fairness require us to pool health care expenses via some form of national health insurance to relieve individuals of the financial burden of their illness?
Enter Money
The headlong pursuit of fairness cannot, however, alone decide our national heal th care policy . What fairness seems to require is that every person be "adequately" insured against health ex penses at a ll times. We fall short of that at present. Approximately 12 percent of Americans have no health insurance at all. As one would expect-since employers are the usual sou rce of health insurance-many of the uninsured are unemployed. Those who are insured differ widely in the extent and depth of their coverage: working people with low incomes often have the worst coverage.
The simple remedy for this situation-seeing to it through government action that everyone is insured for a comprehensive list of services-will certainly drive up the na tion's health bill, perhaps in ways that are morally unjustifiable. To understand this, let us glance briefly at the steadily rising costs of our present health system and their explanatio n.
In Insurance increases the utilization of medical care, and no d oubt much of the increase corresponds to indisputable medical needs that would otherwise be neglected. But not all services w hose use is stimula ted by insurance are indisputably needed. A grea t deal of medical care is discretionary. In the absence of insurance, both doctors and patients are influenced in their decisions about which services are necessary or desirable by the fact that the patient w ill have to pay. By contrast, insurance enables doctors and patients to make these decisions in a cost-free Nirvana. In the end, however, the world of everyday life intrudes: insurance premiums go up .
For that matter, insurance premiums do not accurately indicate to consumers what they are paying for health care. Insofar as premiums are paid by employers, the consumer ex periences them, not as direct payments, but in the form of higher prices for other goods, since the employer passes on his costs. Employer-paid health insurance is ta x-free for employees, moreover, and is not counted in the pay on which the employer's contribution' to Social Security is based. These tax exemptions Report h'om the Ce nte r fo r are presumably made u p by other taxes, but , aga in , consumers do not know w hat they are rea ll y paying for hea lth care.
Under our present system, insurance companies have no t effectively policed healt h care costs. Setting reimbursement standards that effectively monitor and restrain health costs is difficult and expensive for an insurance company. Much medical care is controversial: which is the best or appropriate treatment is often in doubt. Then, too, there is the question of what consumers want. What they have wanted in the United Slates is to pay little o r nothing oul of Iheir own pocket for services (as opposed to paying for insurance), yet to have a free cho ice of doctors or hospitals. The result is insurance plans that pay any doc tor's fee that is "usual, customary, and reasonable"; for the same reasons, the plans typically pay hospitals on the basis of the costs of the care they render or on the basis of their charges for that care. Insurance effect ively eliminates price competition. Our present insurance system , then , reduces competition and masks th e costs of health care. Healt h services may conceivably cost most consumers more than they would be willing to pay if they had the mo ney in their own pockets and were consciously choosing between health care a nd other goods. If this is the case, the system does not serve the best interests of most people-in other wo rds, does not serve socia l utility. Yet the system still conta ins inequities. For example, it is estimated that onl y abou t a third of persons below th e federal poverty line are covered by Medi caid .
The practical problem that confronts us, therefore, is to eliminate the residual unfairness of our health care system wi th out causing too great a utility loss through rising prices. The importance of balancing these considera tions is heightened by the expectation of further demographic aging of the population and new costly breakthroughs in medicine. Fairness itself can be imperiled if we do not heed the problem of costs , excessive federal spending on health care can channel funds away from other public needs, such as education, whose satisfaction , as much as health care, is a mat ter of fairness.
Perfect solutions to the conflict between fairness and cost control are hard to come by. In the economica l sta te-ru n British system, controls on doctors and patients are more extensive tha n would be tolerated in the United States. Other Western European countries, such as France and Germany, basically provide insurance for fee-far-service medicine and have cost problems comparable to our own. In the Un ited States, a tt empts to control costs through regula tion have had little impact, and regu lations that do succeed in controlling costs are themselves problematic. For is it really a good idea to restrict the services that patients can receive from doctors? Might this no t frustrate importa nt patient preferences? Might it not impede medical progress?
What we need is a system that has "the flex ibility of the private market in respondi ng to consu mer needs and preferences, that stimulates cost-consciousness as the market does, yet guarantees an acceptable level of care for everyone in a way that the market cannot in a society characterized by large differences in income and wealth. How can this be ac hieved?
Solution Proposed
One promising soluti on is a system providing universal health insurance through vouchers for the poor and "refundable tax credits" for the non-poor, combined with measures to stimulate pri vate competition among health insurance plans. Such a proposal has been offered by Alain Enthoven.
Under the voucher portion of the system , the government pays for the cost of a private insurance policy selected by the poor person, covering certain s tipulated essentials of health care (inpatient and outpatient hospita l services, emergency health services, catastrophic insurance, and so on). To preserve work incentives, the voucher wou ld vary with income, graduall y declining as income rises. Medicare wou ld continue, as a bow to political realities, and those currently .covered wou ld be able to retain their fee-for-service insurance. But Medicare insurees would also be allowed to receive average annual Medicare payments in a lump sum to be applied to the purchase of a private insurance policy. This w ill provide insurees with incentives to seek comprehensive care from prepaid group practices, which in general have proven more economical than the dominant fee-for-service medical sector. Enthoven expects that eventually it will be possible to abolish the feefor-service element of Medicare and to give all entrants into the Medicare system a lump sum with which to buy the insurance of their choice.
Under the "refundable tax credit" portion of the system, a flat sum is deducted from the taxpayer's tax liability. It is " refundable" in this sense: if your tax liability is lower than the amount of the tax credit, the government will pay you the difference. The tax credit is a claim you have on the government if you buy hea lth insurance (or if an employer buys it for you), and the claim can be settled by a refund. The tax credit would cover 60 percent of the cost of a minimum health insurance policy. Employees would be permitted to negotiate with their employers for part or the whole cost of such a policy, or of a more extensive policy. If the policy is 8 paid for by the employer, employees wou ld receive their tax credit from the government in the form of cash.
Employer contributions under the Enthoven plan would differ in two important ways from present contributions. First, the employee has an incentive to choose a less expensive policy, since the amou nt of the employer contribution wi ll be the same, whatever policy is chosen. Today the employer often pays the whole premium for any policy the employer chooses. Second, the employer contribution will no longer be tax-free, as it is now; it wi ll count as taxable income for the emp loyee. Once employer payments for health insurance become taxable employee income, the true cost of health insurance will become more apparent to the employee-who may therefore urge his or her union to negotiate for less health insurance and more wages.
The plan, then, allows for a variety of insurance policies suited to different tastes and permitting different forms of medical practice. Since the system is structured to provide incentives for choosing less expensive programs, the most economical insurance packages will be favored. Enthoven anticipates that the motor of the system will be the prepaid group practice. In such practices, groups of doctors work together at the same location to provide whatever health care is needed by persons voluntarily enro lled with the group. Since the same organization provides both the insurance and all insured services, costs are kept down. But the feefor-service sector will make a competitive response, looking for new ways of lowering the costs of fee-forservice medicine.
It remains possible that American unions and employers would still prefer to establish comprehensive coverage of the highest-priced fee-for-service health care, even if such a proposal became law. In that case, we would know that Americans like the kind of health care they have when its costs are no longer hidden. It would be worthwhile to find that out. But in fact it is likely that th e American health system would respond to the new structure of incentives.
This proposal, then, has the following s trengths. It provides everyone with a modicum of hea lth care. Thus it recognizes that some healt~ needs are objective and vital and that health care is an important component in equality of opportunity. It also recognizes that much illness and injury is simply bad luck, which should not be allowed to burden the individual financially like an item of voluntary consumption. On the other hand, it permits some differences in personal investment in health insurance, thus acknowledging that much health care ministers to less urgent needs, perhaps even to tastes rather than to needs; further, that the efficacy of many health services is disputable. It promises to contain costs by restructuring the system of incentives to encourage consumers to economize in purchasing health care. Finally, it works by incentives, not by regulations; thus it can be resisted by the American people if their concrete preferences and values run counter to it.
Altogether, not a bad idea.
